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CASENOTES
WATER LAW-INDIAN LAW-Cowboys, Indians and Reserved
Water Rights: May a State Court Limit How Indian Tribes Use

Their Water? In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to
Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources,
State of Wyoming, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992).

A fifteen year history of litigation' over water rights in Wyoming 2
began on January 24, 1977, when the State of Wyoming initiated a
general adjudication 3 of water rights in the Big Horn River
1. The original action resulted in three Wyoming Supreme Court cases identified herein
as Big Horn 1,Big Horn I, and Big Horn II. The first case involved Indian reserved water
rights for the Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes of the Wind River Indian Reservation.
In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988) [hereinafter Big Horn
/].
The second case dealt with claims of non-Indian successors to allotments on the Wind River
reservation. In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, 803 P.2d 61 (Wyo. 1990) [hereinafter Big
The principal case regards the regulation and administration of the reserved rights
Horn Ill.
awarded in Big Horn 1. In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the
Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992)
[hereinafter Big Horn Ill].
2. Wyoming generally follows the doctrine of prior appropriation, or "first in time,
first in right", to determine water rights in the state. To attain a water right for surface water,
a user must first apply for a permit from the State Engineer, stating the purpose of the water
use. The State Engineer may deny such a permit application for any of three reasons: (1) no
unappropriated water is available; (2) the proposed use conflicts with existing uses; or (3) the
proposed use could be detrimental to the public interest. Upon approval of a permit, the user
must "perfect" the water right by putting the water to a "beneficial use." There is no statutory
definition of beneficial use in Wyoming law, but the common understanding is that a beneficial
use is one which is not wasteful or inefficient, is reasonable, and is used for a generally
recognized and socially acceptable use. Within five years after putting the water to beneficial
use, the user must submit an application to change her permit to a water right. The water
division Superintendent, after receiving proof of the appropriation from the applicant, provides
an opportunity for comment or hearing to other water users. The State Board of Control
reviews the application. If the Board approves the application, the water user then owns an
adjudicated water right for a particular use of water in a particular location. The water right
will have a "priority date", the date of the permit application, which determines the seniority
of the water user. All users with a later priority date may not fulfill their water rights until
the senior user receives the water guaranteed by her water right. See Wyo. Stat. §§ 41-3-301
to 42-4-517 (1977 & Supp. 1992). For a more extensive explanation of Wyoming's statutory
provisions, see Mark Squillace, A CriticalLook at Wyoming Water Law, 24 LANDr & WATER
L. REV. 307 (1989). For overviews of the prior appropriation doctrine, see 1 WELLS A. HUTCHTHE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES (1971); JOSEPH L. SAX, ET AL.,
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES (2d. ed. 1991); 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (Robert
INs, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN

E. Beck, ed., 1991); Charles F. Wilkinson, Aldo Leopold and Western Water Law: Thinking
Perpendicularto the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1989).
3. A general adjudication is a court decree which lists every appropriation of water in
a particular river basin. The decree states the name of the appropriator, the date of the priority
of the water right, the amount and purpose of the appropriation, the place of diversion of
the water, the dates and times of the water use and the place of the use. Sax, supra note 2,
at 144.
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System. 4 The goal of the adjudication was to quantify the water rights
of more than 20,000 water users, including potential reserved water
rights' for the Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes of the Wind
River Indian Reservation 6 (hereinafter "Tribes" or "Wind River
Tribes"). Pursuant to the McCarran Amendment, 7 which allows a
state to adjudicate federal reserved water rights, Wyoming filed a
complaint8 for the general adjudication in the district court of the
Fifth Judicial District of Wyoming. 9
The state district court allowed the Wind River Tribes to intervene
in the adjudication, 0 and appointed a special master to hear the case."
After four years of investigation, the special master concluded that
the Tribes owned a reserved water right, based upon the federal
government's purpose of establishing the reservation as a permanent
homeland for the Tribes. 2 To fulfill the "permanent homeland"
purpose, the special master determined, water should be awarded for
irrigation, stock watering, fisheries, wildlife, aesthetics, mineral,
industrial, domestic, commercial, and municipal uses. 13 The special
master quantified the reserved water right according to the practicably
irrigable acreage (PIA) 4 standard, an issue which later received review
by the United States Supreme Court.
4. The Big Horn River System, also identified as Wyoming Water Division 3, encompasses Park, Big Horn, Washakie, Hot Springs and Fremont counties in northwest and central
Wyoming. Squillace, supra note 2, at 311.
5. The reserved rights doctrine recognizes water rights for lands set aside by the federal
government for a particular purpose. The right ensures a quantity of water sufficient to fulfill
the purpose of the federal reservation. See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
6. The federal government originally established the Wind River reservation for the
Shoshone Tribe, but later also moved the Northern Arapaho Tribe to the reservation. United
States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
7. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988). See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
8. Wyoming Statute § 1-37-106 (1988), passed after the McCarran Amendment, allows
the State to institute an action for a general adjudication of water rights.
9. The United States, named as a defendant in the complaint, attempted to remove the
case to federal court, but the United States District Court remanded the adjudication to state
court. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 84.
10. The Tribes argued that the United States would not adequately represent their interests. The Tribes filed supplemental claims for 1,103,000 acre feet of water in addition to
the 640,000 acre feet of water claimed by the United States. Brief for the Petitioner State of
Wyoming on Writ of Certiorari at 6, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) (No.
88-309).
11. First Order of Certification and Referral to a Special Master, Fifth Judicial District,
State of Wyoming, May 29, .1979. Generally, the court charged the special master with the
duties of determining the status of water rights in the Big Horn River System. Big Horn I,
753 P.2d at 85.
12. Report Concerning Reserved Water Right Claims By and On Behalf of the Tribes
of the Wind River Indian Reservation, Wyoming, by Teno Roncalio, Special Master at 692a
(Dec. 15, 1982) (Civil No. 4993), in Appendix H of Wyoming's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Wyoming (Aug. 19, 1988) [hereinafter Roncalio Report]. The special
master applied the principle set forth in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), stating
that a reserved water right consists of sufficient water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the
reservation. Roncalio Report at 441a-442a. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
13. Roncalio Report, supra note 12, at 692a-700a.
14. Id. at 534a. Practicably irrigable acreage is a standard which calculates the quantity
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Following objections to the special master's report by all parties,
District Judge Joffe affirmed the award of a reserved water right for
the Tribes on May 10, 1983 (hereinafter "1983 decree")." Judge Joffe
disagreed, however, with the special master's determination that the
purpose of the establishment of the Wind River Reservation was as
a permanent homeland for the Tribes . 6. Rather, the Judge held that17
the purpose of the reservation was to promote Indian agriculture.
Judge Joffe quantified the Tribes' water rights on the basis of the
"agricultural purpose" using the PIA standard." All parties moved
to alter or amend the decree. 19 On May 24, 1985, District Judge
Johnson2O issued an Amended Judgment and Decree (hereinafter "1985
decree"). 2' All parties appealed the 1985 decree to the Wyoming
Supreme Court.
On February 24, 1988, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed
22
the state district court's award of reserved water rights to the Tribes.
The court agreed that the federal government established the
reservation for agricultural purposes and quantified the water right
based upon agricultural, livestock, municipal, domestic, and
commercial water uses. 23 As with the state district court, the Wyoming

of water which would be necessary to irrigate "those acres susceptible to sustained irrigation

at reasonable costs." Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 101. See Lynnette J. Boomgaarden, Note,
Quantification of Federal Reserved Indian Water Rights - "Practicably Irrigable Acreage"
Under Fire: The Search for a Better Legal Standard, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 417 (1990);
H.S. Burness et al., Practicably Irrigable Acreage and Economic Feasibility: The Role of Time,
Ethics and Discounting, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 289 (1983); H.S. Burness et al., The "New"
Arizona v. California: Practicably Irrigable Acreage and Economic Feasibility, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 517 (1982).
15. Decision Concerning Reserved Water Rights Claims By and On Behalf of the Tribes
of the Wind River Indian Reservation, Wyoming, Fifth Judicial District, State of Wyoming
62-63, May 10, 1983 (Civil No. 4993), amended May 24, 1985 (Docket No. 101-324).
16. Id. at 16-18.
17. Id. at 18. The Judge contended that, rather than to create a permanent homeland,
the government desired only "to convert the Indians from a nomadic to an agrarian people."
Id.
18. Id. at 28.
19. The State made several motions regarding, inter alia, priority dates of reacquired
lands, diversions for domestic and livestock watering uses, corrections of arithmetic calculations,
redefinition of boundaries, and off-reservation lands. The Tribes made motions to include a
quantification of a reserved right for instream flow and fish habitat and to eliminate conditions
for water storage. Order Ruling on Motions to Alter or Amend the Decision of May 10, 1983,
First Judicial District, State of Wyoming, June 8, 1984 (Docket No. 101-234).
20. Judge Johnson was assigned the case on May 13, 1983 upon the retirement of Judge
Joffe.
21. Amended Judgment and Decree, First Judicial District, State of Wyoming, May 24,
1985 (Docket No. 101-234). Generally, Judge Johnson recalculated the reserved water right,
determined priority dates for reacquired lands on the reservation, defined the water uses included in the quantification, and clarified several minor issues. Language in the 1985 decree
later became of issue in the principal case. The Judge stated that "[tihe Tribes are entitled to
make such use of the water covered by their reserved water rights as they deem advisable but
the use is confined to the reservation and in no event shall the consumptive use be increased."
Id. at 17.
22. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 91.
23. Id. at 96-99.
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Supreme Court did not include fishery flow, mineral and industrial
development, wildlife, or aesthetic uses in its quantification. 24 Lastly,
the court affirmed an award of reserved water for future projects,
based on a calculation 2 of reservation lands which were not yet
developed for irrigation. 1
Both the State of Wyoming and the Tribes petitioned for a writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 26 In 1989, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the issue of the Wyoming
court's use of the PIA quantification standard. 2 The Court affirmed
28
the use of the PIA standard without opinion in a 4-4 decision.
Following the Supreme Court's affirmation of Big Horn I, the
Tribes' Joint Business Council adopted a tribal water code stating
the range of purposes for tribal water use. 29 At the same time, the
Wind River Tribes established a Water Resources Control Board to
regulate the Tribes' water rights.30 The Board issued a permit which
allowed the Tribes to dedicate a portion of their awarded future water
rights to an instream flow use3' for the purposes of fishery

24. Id.
25. Id. at 101. The government may reserve water for future requirements as well as for
present uses. Conrad Investment Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908).
26. The State sought review of (1) whether reserved water rights existed, (2) whether the
PIA standard was the proper method of quantification, and (3) the priority date for ceded
reservations lands later returned to the Tribes. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme
Court of Wyoming, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) (No. 88-309). The Tribes
cross-petitioned for review of (I) the "agricultural" as opposed to a "permanent homeland"
purpose, (2) tribal rights to groundwater, (3) denial of the right to export water from the
reservation, (4) the water efficiency rates which the court used, (5) the priority date of nonIndian reserved rights, and (6) the proof required to establish reserved water rights on historic
lands on the reservation. Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of
Wyoming, Shoshone Tribe & Northern Arapaho Tribe of the Wind River Reservation v. Wyoming, 109 S. Ct. 3265 (1989) (No. 88-309) (certiorari denied).
27. The Supreme Court limited its review to question two from the State's petition for
certiorari:
In the absence of any demonstrated necessity for additional water to fulfill reservation purposes and in the presence of substantial state water rights long in use
on the Reservation, may a reserved water right be implied for all practicably irrigable
lands within a Reservation set aside for a specific tribe?
Wyoming v. United States, 488 U.S. 1040 (1989) (No. 88-309).
28. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989). One author suggests that the United
States Supreme Court only grudgingly adhered to precedents of Indian law. Joseph R. Membrino, Indian Reserved Water Rights, Federalism and the Trust Responsibility, 27 LAro &
WATER L. REv. 1, 9. Another author refers to the questions which the Court asked during
oral argument as evidence that the Indian reserved water rights doctrine faces an uncertain
future with the current Supreme Court. Walter Rusinek, Note, A Preview of Coming Attractions? Wyoming v. United States and the Reserved Rights Doctrine, 17 EcoLocy L. Q. 355,
398 (1990).
29. Wind River Interim Water Code (Apr. 12, 1990), revised and adopted as Wind River
Water Code (Mar. 18, 1991).
30. Telephone Interview with John Schumacher, On Reservation Attorney for the Wind
River Tribes (Jan. 13, 1993).
31. Instream flow is a dedication of water in-place (i.e., in the waterway) to assure a
minimum water flow level, usually for the purposes of fish and wildlife maintenance, recreation,
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enhancement, groundwater recharge, and benefits to downstream
irrigators and other water users.32
33
In April of 1990, the instream flow level in the Wind River fell
below the amount dedicated on the Tribes' permit. The Tribes
requested that the State Engineer 4 enforce the permit. The State
Engineer refused, explaining that he did not consider the Tribes' water
award final, since Phases II and III"s of the Big Horn adjudication
were still ongoing. 36 Until the adjudication was final, the State Engineer
water rights as administered in 1977,
declared, he would administer all
37
when the adjudication began.

In July of 1990, the Tribes filed a motion requesting that the
State Engineer be held in contempt for refusing to enforce the instream
flow, and asking the court to appoint a special water master to
implement the Tribes' water rights.3" The district court ruled on March
11, 1991, that the Tribes could change their future reserved water39
right to instream flow without regard to Wyoming state water law.
The court also held that the Tribes would replace the State Engineer
as administrator of tribal water rightsA° The State appealed the

or aesthetics. Recognition of instream flow as a "use" of water is a contentious issue in the
West. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Recognition of Instream Flow Rights: "'New" Public Western
Water Rights, 25 ROCKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 24-1 (1979).
32. Wind River Water Resources Control Board, Instream Flow Permit No. 90-001 (Apr.
12, 1990).
33. The Wind River is a tributary of the Big Horn River which runs through the Wind
River Indian Reservation.
34. The State Engineer is the chief water official in the state and has "general supervision
of the waters of the state." WYo. CONST. art 8, § 5.
35. The special master had divided the adjudication into three separate phases: Phase I
for Indian reserved and any other federal reserved water rights claims, Phase I1 for claims of
non-Indian successors to allotments within the Wind River Reservation, and Phase III for claims
based on state permits or certificates. The principal case is part of Phase I. Phase II has since
been completed and Phase III is ongoing.
36. Letter from Gordon W. Fassett, State Engineer, to Gary P. Hartman, District Judge,
Fifth Judicial District (Mar. 12, 1991) [hereinafter Fassett Letter]. In the principal case, discrepancies exist among the Wyoming Supreme Court justices as to the State Engineer's response
to the enforcement request. In the majority opinion of the principal case, Justice Macy explains
that the State Engineer refused to honor the request because "the Tribes had been awarded
only the right to divert water and that any change in the use of future project water covered
by their reserved water right must be made following a diversion." Big Horn I1, 835 P.2d
at 276. Justice Golden, however, stated that "the state engineer considered the Tribes' 'right'
to commit any portion of their waters to instream flow a 'gray' area and, rather than enforcing
the permit to the letter, he attempted to balance the rights of the [State of Wyoming] with
the request for the instream flow." Id. at 291 (Golden, J., dissenting).
37. Fassett Letter, supra note 36. Using this procedure, the State Engineer was not able
to fulfill the Tribes' instream flow demand, since all irrigators' water demands had priority.
However, a portion of the instream flow was maintained at all times, and after mid-July of
1990, the instream flow was at the approximate level authorized by the Tribes' permit. Big
Horn 111, 835 P.2d at 291 (Golden, J., dissenting).
38. Big Horn III, 835 P.2d at 276.
39. Id.
40. Id. This issue was also later appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court in the principal
case. See infra note 81.
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decision. On May 3, 1991, the Wyoming Supreme Court stayed
enforcement of the judgment and decree pending appeal.
On June 5, 1992, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the
district court and held that the Tribes could not change their future
water right to an instream flow use. 41 The court stated that the Tribes,
"like any other appropriator, must comply with Wyoming water law
to change the use of their reserved future project
water from
'42
agricultural purposes to any other beneficial use."
On September 3, 1992, the Tribes announced that they would
not appeal the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision. 4 After consulting
with legal experts, the Tribes decided that the current United States
Supreme Court would offer little hope of redress, due to its recent
44
holdings allowing greater state intrusions upon tribal sovereignty.
The Tribes emphasized their strong disagreement with the Wyoming
Supreme Court's decision, but stated that they hoped to limit the
potential adverse effects upon other tribes should the Supreme Court
affirm the decision. 4
This casenote questions the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision
in Big Horn III. A discussion of the principles which govern Indian
reserved water rights demonstrates that the Wyoming Supreme Court
was obligated to follow federal law in the Big Horn adjudication.
An overview of federal law illustrates that the water uses defined for
quantification purposes do not limit how a tribe may use its water.
This casenote concludes that the court disregarded both its obligation
to follow federal principles and federal limits to its authority over
tribal water use. The court's decision raises questions concerning the
validity of state courts as forums for the adjudication of Indian
reserved water rights.
BACKGROUND

Federal and Indian Reserved Water Rights
The United States Supreme Court devised the doctrine of federal
reserved water rights in the 1908 case of Winters v. United States.4

41. Big Horn II,
42. Id.

835 P.2d at,279.

43. Katharine Collins, Legal Advice Spurred Wind River Tribes Not to Appeal Water
Decision, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Oct. 5, 1992, at Al.

44. Id.
45. Id. at A0.
46. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). Winters is the case traditionally cited for establishing the Indian
reserved rights doctrine, but two earlier cases recognized the power of the government to reserve
waters from state appropriation. The Winters Court cited these cases. Id. at 577. See United
States v. The Rio Grande Ditch and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899); United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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In Winters, Indians of the Fort Belknap Reservation in Montana
claimed that water diversions by upstream landowners had deprived
the Tribe of water.4 7 Thus, the issue addressed in Winters was whether
the Indians held a protected right to the waters of their reservation.
According to the Supreme Court, the existence of a water right
for the Indians depended upon the "purpose" of the government in
establishing the Fort Belknap Reservation. 48 The Court looked to the
1888 agreement between the Indians and the federal government, and
determined that the reservation had been established for the purpose49
of converting the Indians from a nomadic to a pastoral people.
Without water, the Court reasoned, the arid lands of the reservation
would be valueless, civilized communities could not be established,
and the purpose of the reservation would be defeated.50 The Court
refused to believe that Congress intended to take the Tribe's water,
noting that such an intention would deprive the Indians of the ability
to change to new habits."' Likewise, the Court doubted that the Indians had intended to relinquish their water when they signed the
Fort Belknap treaty. The Court reflected its doubt in an often quoted
statement:
The Indians had command of the lands and the waters - command of all their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting
"and grazing roving herds of stock," or turned to agriculture
and the arts of civilization. Did they give up all this? Did they
give up the waters
reduce the area of their occupation 5and
2
which made it valuable or adequate?
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit Court's injunction
against the upstream water users.53
The Winters doctrine established that the federal government reserves water when it creates a federal reservation. 4 The United States
Supreme Court later clarified the federal reserved rights doctrine in
Cappaert v. United States." In Cappaert, the federal government
sought reserved water rights to protect a species of fish in the Devil's

47. Winters, 207 U.S. at 567.
48. Id. at 575.
49. Id. at 576. Interestingly, the Court concluded that the conversion of the Indians from
a nomadic to a pastoral people represented both the purpqse of the federal government and
the desire of the Indians. Id.
50. Id. at 576-77.
51. Id. at 577.
52. Id. at 576.
53. Id. at 578.
54. A federal reservation is a dedication of withdrawn federal land to a permanent specified purpose. GEORGE C. CoGGINS & CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
RESOURCES LAW 197 (1981).

FEDERAL PuBLIc LAND AND

55. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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Hole National Monument. Because the presidential proclamation which
established the monument noted the importance of the pupfish, the
Court determined that preservation of the pupfish was one "purpose"
of the reservation. 6 The Court stated that when the federal government withdraws land for a federal reservation, it reserves by implication an amount of water necessary to accomplish the purpose of
the reservation. 7 For the Devil's Hole National Monument, the Court
held, the government had reserved an amount of water necessary to
protect the pupfish and thereby accomplish one of the purposes of
the reservation . 8 The Cappaert decision provides the governing principles for the recognition of federal reserved water rights, including
Indian reserved water rights.'

9

State Adjudication of Reserved Water Rights

State courts could not adjudicate federal reserved water rights
until Congress passed the McCarran Amendment in 1952.60 The statute waived federal immunity to suit for the purpose of avoiding duplicative and conflicting adjudications of different types of water rights
in both state and federal forums." In 1976, the United States Supreme
Court held that the McCarran Amendment also
encompassed state
62
adjudications of Indian reserved water rights.

56. Id.at 141.
57. Id.at 138.
58. Id.at 139.
59. The Court stated that the reserved water rights doctrine also applies to Indian reservations. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138.
60. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988). Part (a) of the Amendment states:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2)
for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the
owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State
law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary
party to such suit. The United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be
deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or
that the United States is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2)
shall be subject to the judgments, orders and decrees of the court having jurisdiction,
and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs
shall be entered against the United States in any such suit.
61. United States v. District Court In and for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
62. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The
Supreme Court considered several factors in addition to that of avoiding piecemeal litigation,
including the lack of federal adjudicatory proceedings as opposed to a comprehensive adjudication system in Colorado, the quantity of state water rights holders who would be named
as defendants, the proximity of the state and federal courts to the site of the dispute, and the
federal government's participation in other reserved water rights cases in Colorado. These factors, according to the Court, outweighed the importance of federal adjudication of the water
right. Id. at 811.
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The McCarran Amendment opened the door to state involvement
in the determination of federal reserved water rights. 63 Despite the
application of the McCarran Amendment to Indian reserved water
rights, however, the United States Supreme Court directed state courts
to define Indian water rights in reference to federal law. 4 In Arizona
v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona,65 the Supreme Court clearly
stated that state courts have a "solemn obligation" to follow principles of federal law when adjudicating Indian reserved water rights.6
Additionally, the Court warned that any decision by a state judiciary
which violated federal protection of Indian water rights would receive
"a particularized and exacting scrutiny commensurate with the powerful federal interest in safeguarding those rights from state encroachment. "67
Defining the Scope of Indian Water Use after State Adjudication
Only a few authorities address how Indian tribes may use their
water following an award of reserved water rights. The sources assert
that, while a state may determine the existence and-quantity of a
reserved water right, the determination does not limit how a tribe
may use its awarded water. The precedent most often cited for this
rule is the report of the special master in Arizona v. California,"
which involved a complex adjudication of water rights for the Colorado. River. The special master distinguished between the quantification of the water right and the uses to which the water could be
put, stating that quantification for agricultural purposes did not limit
water usage to agricultural purposes. 69 A Supplemental Decree later

63. This result was precisely the desire of the Western states which were frustrated with
the uncertainty created by federal reserved water rights. Because the federal government would
quantify water only when the United States needed the water, states were never certain how
much water remained for appropriation to state users. The uncertainty reportedly slowed water
development in the West. See Michael D. White, McCarran Amendment Adjudications - Problems, Solutions, Alternatives, 22 LAND & WATER L. REv. 619 (1987). See also Frank J. Trelease,
Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638 (1957).
64. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 811. See also Felix S. Cohen,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 583 (1982 ed.).
65. 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
66. Id. at 571. The Court stated, "[w]e also emphasize, as we did in Colorado River,
that our decision in no way changes the substantive law by which Indian rights in state water
adjudications must be judged. State courts, as much as federal courts, have a solemn obligation
to follow federal law." Id.
67. Id. One author doubts the Court's supposed willingness to stand ready to correct
abuses of state adjudications, due partly to the complex factual determinations involved in
adjudication procedures. Cohen, supra note 64, at 602-03 n.14.
68. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
69. Report from Simon H. Rifkind, Special Master to the Supreme Court in Arizona v.
California (Dec. 5, 1960). Specifically, the special master stated:
This does not necessarily mean, however, that water reserved for Indian Reservations
The measmay not be used for purposes other than agriculture and related uses ....
urement used in defining the magnitude of the water rights is the amount of water
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issued by the Court 70 reiterated the special master's holding, stating
that the PIA standard, as the means of determining the quantity of
adjudicated water rights, did not restrict the usage of the water to

agricultural applications."
Following Arizona, the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior recommended to the Secretary of the Interior that Indian reserved water rights could be used for any beneficial purpose. 72 There
could be no reason, the Solicitor stated, to mandate that the Indians
use their water only for agriculture. 73 The Solicitor compared such
a restriction to mandating
that Indians could use their lands only for
74
agricultural purposes.
The Ninth Circuit relied upon Arizona when it addressed an Indian water use issue in Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton. 75 The
Colville Tribes wanted to use water for trout spawning as part of
their water rights which had been quantified on the basis of a fishing
grounds purpose. 76 The court allowed the use, stating that a tribe
77
may use its vested right in reserved water in any lawful manner.
Indian tribes have made very few attempts to secure reserved
water rights. 78 Arizona v. California9 resulted in an award of reserved
water rights to five Indian tribes, and was the landmark case precedenting assertions of Indian reserved water rights. Since Arizona,
Indian water rights have become an issue of increasing importance
and conflict in the water dependent West.80

necessary for agriculture and related purposes because this was the initial purpose
of the reservation, but the decree establishes a property right which the United States
may utilize or dispose of for the benefit of the Indians as the relevant law may allow.
Id. at 265-66.
70. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979).
71. Id.at 422. The State of Wyoming, in the principal case, attacked the precedential
value of Arizona because the parties stipulated to the decree. Brief of Appellant State of
Wyoming at 24, Big Horn 111, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992) (Nos. 91-43, 84, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96,
97) [hereinafter Brief of Wyoming].
72. Solicitor's Memorandum to the Secretary of the Interior (Feb. 1, 1964).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 647 F.2d 42 t9th Cir. 1981).
76. Id. at 48. The court quantified the water rights for the purposes of development and
maintenance of fishing grounds. Id. at 48-49.
77. Id.
78. See United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956); Alaska
Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918); Conrad Investment.Co. v. United States,
161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908). The non-assertion of Indian reserved water rights arguably can be
attributed to the failure of the federal government, as trustee, to secure the rights because they
conflict with the government's interest in securing other federal reserved rights. See Membrino,
supra note 28.
79. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO CONGRESS, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS FOR FEDERAL AND INDIAN RESERVATIONS: A GROWING CONTROVERSY IN

NEED OF RESOLUTION (1978); RICHARD L. FOREMAN, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS: A PUBLIC POLICY
AND ADMINISTRATIVE MESS

(1981).
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PRINCIPAL CASE"'

Quite noticeable about the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision
in Big Horn III is the court's issuance of five separate opinions. While
three justices held that the Tribes could not change their reserved
water use to instream flow, each voiced a different rationale and
authored a separate opinion. Two justices wrote dissenting opinions
0
on the issue.
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Macy, divided the
issue of whether the Tribes could change the use of their water into
two components. First, the court discussed whether the Tribes could
use their future reserved water for instream flow. The Tribes argued
that the two earlier district court decisions controlled the issue.8 2 According to the Tribes, the 1983 decree 3 determined that the agricultural purposes relied upon to quantify the water did not limit the
Tribes' water uses, and the 1985 decree had established that the Tribes
could use their water for instream flow.8 Conversely, the State contended that the 1985 decree 5 controlled the issue, because it specifically awarded only a "right to divert" waters,8 6 and8 7a right to divert
could not be transferred to an instream flow right.
The court rejected both parties' arguments on the basis that the
Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Big Horn I had already decided the issue. 88 The majority held that Big Horn I "clearly stated"
that the Tribes could use their water right solely for agricultural purposes, and not for instream flow. 9 Justice Macy clarified that the
quantification of water rights in Big Horn I was not merely a methodology, but was a determination of how the Tribes could use their
water rights. 90

81. The instream flow use issue discussed in this casenote was one of two issues decided
in the principal case. On the second issue, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the district
court erred by replacing the State Engineer with the Tribes as the administrator of the Wind
River tribal water rights. Big Horn 111, 835 P.2d at 280-83.
82. Brief of Appellees Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes at 12, Big Horn Ill, 835
P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992) (Nos. 91-43, 84, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97) [hereinafter Brief of Tribes].
83. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
84. Big Horn III, 835 P.2d at 276-77. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
86. Brief of Wyoming, supra note 71, at 11. The State argued that the right to divert
necessitated a physical diversion of the waters. Id. The Tribes' instream flow use did not involve
a physical diversion, since the water was to remain in the waterway.
87. Id. at 17.
88. Big Horn 111, 835 P.2d at 277.

89. Id. at 278.
90. Id. According to Chief Justice Macy, if the Big Horn I court had intended that the
quantification process was merely a method for determining the amount of the Tribes' water,
it would have stated so. Absent such a statement, the Chief Justice argued, the Big Horn I
court's quantification of water rights also determined the uses to which the Tribes could put
their water. Id.
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The court dismissed the Tribes' argument that the Wyoming Supreme Court should have followed principles of federal law, which
do not limit how the Tribes could use their water. 9' Again, the court
held that Big Horn I, having been affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court, was final and controlling. 92 Justice Macy closed the
issue by stating that the Tribes do not have an unfettered right to
use their water for any purpose which they desire.93
The court next addressed the second component of the change
of use issue, whether the Tribes could change their water use without
regard to Wyoming water law. The Tribes maintained that the State
lacked authority to regulate tribal water rights, 94 and presented several
bases for their argument. First, the Tribes contended that federal law
controlled the issue, as evidenced by the court's statement in Big Horn
I that "the decree entered in the instant case does not require application of state water law to the Indian reservation." 95 The Tribes
also argued that precedents in federal water and Indian law supported
the change of use without regard to state law, and that state regulation of the Tribes' water was preempted. 96 Third, the Tribes stated
that interpretations of the McCarran Amendment held that only federal sovereign immunity is waived in state adjudications, not the fed97
eral government's power to invoke authority over federal water rights.
The Wyoming Supreme Court again rejected the Tribes' reliance
upon the district court decisions. The court held that Big Horn I,
not the district court decisions, controlled the issue. 98 It would make
no sense for the court to limit tribal use of water in Big Horn I,
argued Chief Justice Macy, and then allow the Tribes to change the
use based upon the district court's earlier decisions. 9
Chief Justice Macy next explained that the statement in Big Horn
I that "[tihe decree entered in the instant case does not require application of state water law to the Indian reservation" could not be
taken out of context.- ° According to Justice Macy, the statement was
an acknowledgement that the Tribes' reserved right derived from the
treaty which created the reservation, and was not dependent upon
state law for its existence.' 0' The Chief Justice argued that the Big
Horn I court had clearly stated that oversight of the Tribes' reserved

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Brief of Tribes, supra note 82, at 41.

95. Id. at 39 (citing Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 115).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 45-5 1.
98. Big Horn 111, 835 P.2d at 278.

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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water by the state had not been preempted by federal law." 2
The court also rejected the Tribes' federal law arguments. In
response to the argument that federal law governs Indian reserved
water rights, the court replied that the Tribes had not provided any
precedents in support of their argument. 0 3 Nor was the Tribes' preemption argument persuasive, stated the court.'0 Conversely, the majority concluded that the Tribes must comply with Wyoming water
law to change their water use, 05 and turned to two federal cases as
support. First, the court cited United States v. Mexico'01 for its holding that reserved water rights extend only to the amount of water
necessary to meet the primary purpose of the reservation, and that
any secondary purposes must be acquired under state law. 0 7 Second,
the court relied upon United States v. Adair,08 in which the Ninth
Circuit Court would not allow the United States to use Indian reserved water rights for forest and wildlife programs because it would
amount to "tacking" a new reserved right onto a prior reserved right.'19
The federal cases, according to Chief Justice Macy, clearly applied
to and limited the Tribes' right to change the use of their water." 0
As reflected by the majority opinion, the Wind River Tribes cannot change their future reserved water right to an instream flow right
and must comply with state water law to change their water uses.
Justice Cardine, although concurring with the holding, disagreed that
the Tribes should be subject to state water law."' Justice Cardine
argued that the Tribes must first put the water to a beneficial use,
and as required by Big Horn I, the beneficial use must be for an
agricultural purpose." 2 Once put to beneficial use, Justice Cardine
believed, the Tribes could then change the use without being "hamstrung by compliance with Wyoming statutes defining acceptable uses
and procedures for change of use.""' 3 However, Justice Cardine advocated that state water law supply guidance in defining the scope
4
of Indian reserved water rights."

102. Id. (citing Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 114).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 279.
106. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
107. Big Horn IIl, 835 P.2d at 278.
108. 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
109. Big Horn III, 835 P.2d at 279.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 285 (Cardine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112. Id. at 285-86. Justice Cardine implied that instream flow is not a beneficial use, a
theory which differs from the opinion of Justice Golden. See infra note 126 and accompanying
text.
113. Big Horn I1, 835 P.2d at 287.
114. Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1993

13

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 28 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 2
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVIII

Justice Brown" 5 dissented from the court's holding. The justice
first argued that the majority opinion treated the Tribes' water right
as an appropriation under state law, rather than as a right which6
evolved from the treaty which created the Wind River Reservation."
According to Justice Brown, by limiting the Tribes' water uses, the
majority was making "marginal farmers out of the Tribes forever,"
thereby failing to give proper effect to the Tribes' treaty,." 7
Secondly, Justice Brown disagreed with the majority's reliance
on Big Horn I as controlling authority. Justice Brown argued that
Big Horn I did not consider a change 'of use issue, nor did it address
changing a reserved right for agriculture to an instream flow right."'
Conversely, Justice Brown believed that the 1983 and 1985 district
court decrees which allowed change of use represented the law of the
case." The majority mistakenly cited Big Horn I as authority to
prohibit a change of use, Justice Brown contended, because "all [other]
authority is to the contrary."' 120
In his dissent, Justice Golden agreed with Justice Brown that Big
Horn I did not address whether the Tribes could change the use of
their water.' 2' The primary issue in Big Horn I, Justice Golden stated,
was quantification of the water rights.tn Using an argument similar
to Justice Macy's in the majority opinion, 23 Justice Golden noted
that had the Big Horn I court intended to limit the Tribes' water

115. Justice Brown, retired Justice of the Wyoming Supreme Court, heard the case for
Justice Urbigkit, who recused himself for conflict of interest.
116. Big Horn III, 835 P.2d at 288 (Brown, J. (retired), concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
117. Id.
118. Id. Justice Brown harshly criticized the majority's reliance on Big Horn I, stating
that "[tihe majority, however, quotes portions of Big Horn I out of context and bootstraps
the case to support its determination in the case before us" and "[tihe majority pumps air
into its Big Horn I decision, then cites the enhanced opinion for its determination that the
Tribes cannot change their right to divert water for agricultural purposes to an instream flow
for fisheries." Id.
119. Id. at 289.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 293 (Golden, J.,dissenting). Justice Golden chided the majority for claiming
that Big Horn I addressed the use issue, stating that the majority's rationale reminded him of
the following passage:
"I see nobody on the road," said Alice.
"I only wish I had such eyes," the king remarked in a fretful tone. "To be able
to see Nobody! And at that distance too! Why, it's as much as I can do to see real
people in this light!"
Id.at 293 n.2 (citing LEwis CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There
136 (1872)).
122. Id.at 293.
123. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Justice Macy stated "[i]f we had intended
to specify what the water could be used for merely as a methodology to determine the amount
of water the Tribes could use for any purpose, we would have said so." Big Horn III, 835
P.2d at 278.
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uses, it could have made a clear statement to that effect, but did
not. 124
The proper interpretation of Big Horn I, according to Justice
Golden, was that the Tribes may use their water for their best interests
as long as the use does not interfere with the "public right."' 12 Justice
Golden reasoned that the beneficial use concept allows the Tribes to
use their water for any beneficial use, including instream flow.1 26 Any
aggrievance to the public right resulting from the Tribes' choice of
water use, Justice Golden stated, should be presented to the district
court for a possible remedy. 127

In conclusion, Justice Golden criticized the court for its "crabbed
interpretation" of the proper uses of tribal reserved waters 28 and for
continuing an age old agenda to expropriate Indian lands and waters. 2 9 The majority's decision, according to Justice Golden, was a
deliberate attempt to undermine the Tribes under the "distorted guise
130
of state water law superiority.'
Helpful to understanding the Big Horn III decision is a "Guide
to the Court's Present Opinion ' ' 3' which Justice Golden prepared
and included in his dissent. Justice Golden summarized the court's
differences and noted inconsistencies within the justices' opinions.
The synopsis highlights the wide range of rationales presented by the
Wyoming Supreme Court in deciding Big Horn IlL 32

124. Big Horn III, 835 P.2d at 278.
125. Id. at 293. Justice Golden explained the "public right" standard as providing that
a resolution would occur where a change in use is injurious to the commonweal, as opposed
to only certain individuals, and where the injury results from more than mere assertion of a
water right. Id. at 293 n.3.
126. Id. at 293-94. The Justice stated that "[tlhere simply is no question but that an
instream flow is a beneficial use, whether studied under the federal law which must govern in
this instance, or studied under traditional Wyoming state water law, which may have some
application here as persuasive authority." Id. at 294. Note that in Wyoming, however, only
the State may own an instream flow right. Therefore, instream flow is not a beneficial use
available to other appropriators. See Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-1002(e) (1977 & Supp. 1992).
127. Big Horn Il, 835 P.2d at 294. However, Justice Golden noted that no remedial
injury would exist if the harm of using the water right for instream flow would also occur if
the water were used for irrigation. Id.
128. Id. Justice Golden believed that the United States Supreme Court had clearly set forth
the proper uses of Indian reserved water rights in Winters, in which the Court stated that the
Indians retained "command of the lands and the waters - command of all their beneficial use,
whether kept for hunting, 'and grazing roving herds of stock,' or turned to agriculture and
the arts of civilization." Id. (quoting 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908)). See supra notes 46-53 and
accompanying text.
129. Big Horn I1, 835 P.2d at 303-04.
130. Id. at 304.
131. Id. at 300.
132. Pertinent to this casenote are the following summaries by Justice Golden:
1. Interpretation of Big Horn 1:
Ia. Big Horn I gave right to use water only for agricultural purposes, not for
an instream flow - Justice Macy; Justice Thomas generally agrees.
b. Sees real issue now as sovereignty though this was not addressed in Big
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There is great potential for conflict between state water laws and
Indian reserved water rights.' 33 The Big Horn adjudication epitomizes
this conflict. The Wyoming Supreme Court, as one of the first state
courts to complete an adjudication of Indian reserved water rights,
had an opportunity to set a precedent which could sort through the
conflict and attempt to accommodate both the State's and the Tribes'
interests. But the court's decision falls far short of providing any
such precedent. Rather, the decision disregards relevant federal principles, imposes strict limitations on the Tribes, and raises doubts about
the ability of state courts to fairly adjudicate Indian reserved water
rights.
The Tribes' reserved water right is a federal right arising under
federal law. 3 4 When the United States Supreme Court held that the

Horn I - Justice Thomas,
Big Horn I never discussed change of use or other uses - Justices Golden
and Brown.
2. What Law Applies to Change of Use
Ia. Tribes must seek change of use for future project waters under state law
- Justices Macy and Thomas
b. Change of use is not subject to state law; Federal or Tribal law applies;
but also states that federal policy of deference to state water law must be
respected - Justice Cardine.
c. State law does not apply to change of use and not supported by Big Horn
I; federal law applies; following Big Horn 1, state acknowledged various
water uses permitted by Tribes and should now be estopped from changing
its position - Justices Golden and Brown.
3. Beneficial Use
Ia. Beneficial use is key and is seen as an evolving concept - Justice Macy;
Justice Thomas generally agrees.
b. Future "paper right" must be applied to beneficial use before allowed to
interfere with state appropriators and beneficial use is defined only as irrigation; but determines that beneficial use should be broadly applied to
the federal reserved right and therefore allow for instream flow development; disagrees with Justice Macy that "change of use must be hamstrung
by compliance with Wyoming statutes defining acceptable uses"; states that
when Indian rights are not in use they may be taken by junior appropriators
c.

- Justice Cardine.

c.

Earlier district court decisions in this case by Judges Joffe and Johnson
held that Tribes may use water in any manner they deem advisable or to
their benefit; this was not reversed by Big Horn I and is now the law of
the case - Justices Golden and Brown.

Id. at 301-02.
133. See, e.g., D. Craig Bell and Norman K. Johnson, State Water Laws and Federal
Water Uses: The History of Conflict, The Prospects for Accommodation, 21 ENv. LAW 47,
52 (1991), in which the authors attribute the conflict to the displacement of state water rights
by federal reserved water rights which would have an earlier priority date, therefore giving
federal reserved water rights holders the superior right to use water.
134. See F. COHEN, supra note 64, at Ch. 10; 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note
2, at § 37.
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McCarran Amendment allowed state courts to adjudicate Indian water rights,' 35 the Court explicitly instructed states to follow federal
law. 3 6 Three of the five justices on the Wyoming Supreme Court
recognized this directive. 13 7 Oddly, however, the majority opinion disregarded the applicable federal laws, mischaracterized other federal
laws to support its reasoning, and determined the scope of the Tribes'
reserved water rights according to Wyoming water law.'
The Big Horn III majority relied upon two United States Supreme Court decisions, but the applicability of both cases is questionable. First, the court relied upon United States v. New Mexico3 9
for its "primary purpose" test. The New Mexico Court held that
reserved water rights are reserved only to the extent necessary to fulfill
the primary purpose of the reservation, and that water rights for any
secondary .purposes must arise under state law.140 The applicability
of New Mexico is problematic for two reasons. First, the primary
purpose test determines the purposes for which water rights were originally reserved. It does not address the transfer of a primary purpose
water right to a different use. Chief Justice Macy misrepresented the
applicability of New Mexico. Second, the primary purpose test arguably applies only to non-Indian federal reserved water rights, not

to Indian reserved water rights.' 4' Ironically, the Wyoming Supreme
Court noted the questionable validity of the primary purpose test to
Indian reserved water rights in Big Horn 1,142 but overlooked the
problem in Big Horn IIL
A second situation further illustrates the court's misuse of federal
law. The court relied upon United States v. Adair 43 as authority that
the Tribes must comply with state law. The excerpt relied upon by
the court, however, addressed an attempted conversion of a water
right by the United States, not by the Tribes. The United States sought

135. One author criticizes the Supreme Court's decision to allow states to adjudicate Indian
reserved water rights, arguing that the Court misjudged the experience and ability of state
courts. Membrino, supra note 28, at 3-4. See also COHEN, supra note 64, at 601.
136. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
137. Justices Cardine, Brown and Golden, respectively. All three justices specifically state
in their dissents that federal law applies to Indian reserved water rights.
138. Although three of the five justices believe that federal law applies, the majority held
that the Tribes are subject to state law. This is due to Justice Cardine's belief that the court
must consider the state beneficial use concept, and that the Tribes must first put tlieir water
to a beneficial use before changing the water use. For this reason, Justice Cardine concurred
with the majority's holding that the Tribes must comply with state law. See supra notes 111114 and accompanying text.
139. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
140. Id. at 702.
141. See COHEN, supra note 64, at 583-84 (stating that "[t]he relevant inquiry in ascertaining Indian reserved rights is not whether a particular use is primary or secondary but whether
it is completely outside the scope of a reservation's purpose.")
142. Big Horn 1. 753 P.2d at 96.
143. 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
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to convert an Indian reserved water right to wildlife and forest uses.,"
This situation differs from the Wind River Tribes' desire to use their
own water for instream flow purposes, and therefore is inapplicable.
Unfortunately, the court's attention to federal law, although incorrect federal law, did not persist in Big Horn III. Instead, the court
turned to state law as a basis for limiting the Tribes' water right,
relying specifically upon the state's beneficial use principle.'4 5 Because
instream flow is not a legally recognized beneficial use in the State
of Wyoming,'"6 the court denied the Tribes the right to use water for
instream flow. By doing so, the court made a distinction between the
source of the Tribes' water right and the adjudication of the water
right. The court implied that the water right arises from federal law,
but is then subject to state law for adjudication. The federal government, however, has not made this distinction.
The source of the court's confusion is its misunderstanding of
the Winters doctrine, 141 exemplified by its reliance upon the following
statement from Big Horn I: "Itihe government may reserve water
from appropriation under state law for use on the lands set aside for
an Indian reservation.' 4 Chief Justice Macy interpreted the statement as requiring that the waters be appropriated under state law.
But as Justice Golden pointed out in his dissent, the court misconstrued the Big Horn I statement by erroneously placing emphasis on
state law as the source of the appropriation. The statement in Big
Horn I derives from Winters, in which the court stated: "[t]he power
of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be."'' 4 9

144. Id.
145. The court also noted that even if the Tribes sought to change to a legally recognized
beneficial use, they would have to comply with the state change of use statute. Big Horn 111,
835 P.2d at 280, n.7. The statute provides that a change in the use or place of use of water
may be allowed if the water transferred does not (1) exceed the amount of water historically
diverted under an existing use; (2) exceed the historic rate of diversion under an existing use;
(3) increase the historic amount consumptively used under an existing use; (4) decrease the
historic amount of return flow under an existing use; or (5) injure in any manner other lawful
appropriators. WYo. STAT. § 41-3-104 (1977). Although the requirement of following the change
of use statute is not a direct holding in the case, it raises the same issue of whether the court
can require the Tribes to comply with state law.
146. Instream flow is a legally recognized use in Wyoming only for the State. No other
appropriator may hold an instream flow right in Wyoming. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 41-3-1001-1014
(1977 & Supp. 1992). For discussions of the instream flow issue in Wyoming, see Squillace,
supra note 2, at 316; Matthew Reynolds, Comment, Wyoming's New Instream Flow Act: An
Administrative Quagmire, 21 LAND & WATER L. REv. 455 (1986); Rick A. Thompson, Comment, Statutory Recognition of Instream Flow Preservation:A ProposedSolutionfor Wyoming,
17 LAND & WATER L. REv. 139 (1982).
147. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.

148. Big Horn 111, 835 P.2d at 277 (quoting Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 94 (emphasis added
in Big Horn 111)).

149. 207 U.S. 564, 577 (citing United States v. Rio Grande Ditch and Irrigation Co., 174
U.S. 690, 702 (1899)).
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It is clear from the meaning of Winters as a whole that the Court
did not intend the emphasis upon state law as was made by Justice
Macy. Rather, Winters established that Indian reserved water rights
exist independent of state appropriation procedures. Chief Justice
Macy's interpretation is therefore contrary to Winters.
The court's decision is also contrary to the relevant federal principles which the court neglected to follow. Federal law differentiates
between the quantification of water rights and the subsequent uses
of reserved waters. 5 0 But the majority in Big Horn III took a completely opposite stance and held that the purposes identified in Big
Horn I for quantification of the Tribes' water rights also determined
how the Tribes may use the water. As authority for this position,
the court erroneously relied upon its Big Horn I decision. The reliance
is invalid for two reasons. First, the issue of actual usage of the
awarded rights never surfaced in Big Horn L 151 That case determined
how much water to award the Tribes; how the Tribes could use the
water was never an issue before the court. Second, the court implied
that the United States Supreme Court's affirmance of Big Horn I
provided further support that Big Horn I controlled the decision in
Big Horn II."52 However, the United States Supreme Court reviewed
only one issue.from Big Horn I, the PIA quantification procedure.' 53
The Supreme Court's affirmance of the PIA standard thus is completely unrelated to the issues presented in Big Horn III, and Chief
Justice Macy's opposite implication is unwarranted.
The Wyoming Supreme Court's insistence upon mandating the
Tribes' water use is not difficult to understand, given its ramifications. By limiting the Tribes' water uses to the agricultural purposes
of the reservation identified in Big Horn I, the court is in effect
limiting the Tribes to an agricultural lifestyle. Considering the high
costs of capital required for irrigation projects, 5 4 it is possible that
the Tribes would not be able to utilize their rights for agricultural

150. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
151. Justices Brown and Golden aptly argued iq their dissents that the change of use issue
presented in Big Horn III was .not an issue before the court in Big Horn L See supra notes
118-124 and accompanying text.
152. The court stated that "Big Horn I, having been affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court, is final and controlling." Big Horn I1, 835 P.2d at 278.
153. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
154. But see Reid Peyton Chambers & John E. Echohawk, Implementing the Winters
Doctrine of Indian Reserved Water Rights: Producing Indian Water and Economic Development
Without Injuring Non-Indian Water Users? 27 GoNz. L. Rav. 447 (1992), in which the authors
state that Congress has awarded large amounts of money to tribes via water settlement acts.
Id. at 462-63. The authors report that the amount "is over and above the construction costs
of federal storage and water delivery projects." Id. at 463. Note, however, that the Wind River
Tribes have not yet been the beneficiary of such water settlement acts by Congress.
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purposes.' The limitations set by the court thus raise the question
of whether the Tribes' future water right will remain unused.
An unused water right under Wyoming's prior appropriation system leaves a greater quantity of water available for junior users. The
Tribes own an 1868 priority right, an early and valuable right senior
to other water rights holders in the Big Horn system. But if the Tribes
are not able to use their water, state permit holders with a junior
priority date would be ensured a greater quantity of available water.
In effect, the junior state users would have greater protection and
less potential for injury.
But the potential injury to state water users is a factor which
the court should not consi4ler in adjudicating water rights. The United
States Supreme Court has held that Indian reserved water rights must
be recognized despite the displacement of state water rights.'" 6 The
Big Horn III decision raises a suspicion that the court is indeed trying
to protect state water rights. Such a goal would not be surprising,
considering the importance of water in the West and the hostility of
western states towards reserved water rights.'1 7 Chief Justice Macy
summarized the situation quite well with his statement that "[wiater
is simply too precious to the well being of society to permit water
right holders unfettered control over its use."' 58
. The importance of water to the State of Wyoming, however, does
not allow the court to strictly limit the Tribes' water rights. Such a
limitation is contrary to the federal government's policies of tribal
sovereignty and self determination.1 9 The Wyoming Supreme Court

155. This argument also arises in the context of whether Indian tribes may transfer their
water off the reservation via selling or leasing the water. See David H. Getches, Water Rights

on Indian Allotments, 26 S.D. L. REV. 405 (1981); Bill Leaphart, Sale and Lease of Indian
Water Rights, 33 MONT. L. REV. 266, 275 (1972); Christine Lichtenfels, Comment, Indian
Reserved Water Rights: An Argument for the Right to Export and Sell, 24 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 131 (1989); Jack D. Palma II, Considerationsand Conclusions Concerning the Transferability of Indian Water Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 91 (1980); Lee Herold Storey, Note,
Leasing Indian Water Off the Reservation: A Use Consistent With the Reservation'sPurpose,
76 Cal. L. Rev. 179 (1988).
156. See Cohen, supra note 64, at 587 (citing Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128,
138 n.4; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597 (1963); United States v. Washington, 506
F. Supp. 187, 204-05 (W.D. Wash. 1980)).
157. See, e.g., Jeff Taylor and Duane Birdbear, Note, State Jurisdiction to Adjudicate
Indian Reserved Water Rights, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 221 (1978), in which the authors cite a
recommendation by the Western Conference of the Council of State Governments that would
"prohibit Indians from voting in state elections unless they surrender jurisdiction over their
lands and persons to the states." Id. at 228-29 (citing The New Mexican (Santa Fe), Sept. 28,
1977, at 1,col. 4).
158. Big Horn 111, 835 P.2d 273, at 280.
159. A discussion of the federal government's Indian policies is beyond the scope of this
Icasenote. Generally, the government has encouraged Indian tribes to remain as distinct, political
entities free to control the future of the reservation community. See Worcester v. Cherokee
Nation, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE NATIONS
WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY (1984).
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did not acknowledge the federal government's desire that Indian tribes
be autonomous, self-sufficient communities. Instead, the court persisted in encroaching upon the Tribes' autonomy. As a result, the
Tribes now are limited to using their water for agricultural purposes,
a limitation which will affect the Tribes' economic status as well as
their freedom to determine the future of the Wind River Reservation.
The court's decision thus extends the boundaries for state authority over Indian tribes, and raises the issue of whether state courts
can fairly adjudicate Indian reserved water rights. 160 The United States
Supreme Court's primary reason for allowing state adjudications of
Indian reserved water rights was to avoid piecemeal adjudications in
both state and federal courts. However, it is likely that the State of
Wyoming would not have adjudicated the Big Horn System had it
not been for the Tribes' reserved water rights. 611 In that case, the
federal courts could have adjudicated the Tribes' rights without a
concurrent adjudication of state water rights.
Despite the problems that conflicting adjudications would cause,
however, a more important question is whether Indian tribes receive
a fair forum in state courts. The Big Horn III decision indicates that
state protectionism will play a role in state court adjudications. It is
not surprising that a state would attempt to protect its water rights,
given the importance of water in the West and the displacement of
state water rights by earlier Indian reserved water rights. Conversely,
the Tribes' decision not to appeal Big Horn III for fear of an unfair
decision by the United States Supreme Court' 62 suggests that the federal courts, as well, may not offer a fair forum for the adjudication
of Indian reserved water rights.
CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court has permitted state courts to
adjudicate Indian reserved water rights, but has qualified the process
with a mandate that state courts follow federal law. The Wyoming
Supreme Court disobeyed this mandate in Big Horn III by disregarding federal law and reaching a decision which is contrary to federal principles. Federal precedents do not allow a state court to limit
how Indian tribes may use their reserved water rights.
Big Horn III strengthens the argument that state courts are not
a fair forum for the adjudication of Indian reserved water rights.
Wyoming's lack of legitimate legal support for its decision suggests

160. See Michael Lieder, Note, Adjudication of Indian Water Rights Under the McCarran
Amendment: Two Courts Are Better Than One, 71 GEoxcE. L.J. 1023 (1983).
161. See Membrino, supra note 28, at 6.
162. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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that the court is protecting state water rights at the expense of the
Tribes. Considering the importance of water in the West, the uncertainty created by reserved water rights, and the history of statetribal hostility, it is not difficult to predict the underlying policy considerations that will encourage states to protect state water rights when
adjudicating Indian reserved water rights. The Big Horn III majority
has fallen victim to such policy considerations, and in the process
has illegitimately extended the boundaries of state authority over Indian tribes. Fortunately, however, the lack of a clear consensus in
the five separate opinions issued by the Wyoming Supreme Court
severely limits the precedential value of Big Horn III.
PEGGY SuE KIRK
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